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ANGELS OR DEMONS? EVIDENCE ON THE IMPACT OF  
PRIVATE EQUITY FIRMS ON EMPLOYMENT 
 




•  The impact of private equity firms on employment in their portfolio companies is a con-
troversial topic widely discussed in academia and in practice in recent years.  
•  A large body of research has resulted from this debate. The studies are focused on differ-
ent aspects of employment and are based on a variety of methodologies as well as sam-
ples representing e.g. different types of buyouts and geographies. 
•  The aim of this paper is to provide access to and enhance the understanding of the highly 
fragmented literature by way of a systematic review and to discuss areas for future re-
search. 
•  We review evidence on employment growth, financial and non-financial indicators of 
employment in a total of 49 studies. The analysis of similarities and differences of the 
studies revealed manifold consequences of private equity on employment. Our review re-
veals that the impact varies across different employment indicators and between geogra-
phies. 
•  We conclude that it is not possible to label private equity firms either positively or nega-
tively – as “angels or demons” – as this would not take account of their complex and het-
erogeneous effects on employees post-buyout. 
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1  Introduction 
 
In the late 1980s, the U.S. buyout market experienced its first major upswing in the U.S. 
(Kaplan/Strömberg 2008) and, as a result, a number of academic studies were undertaken to 
analyse the impact of private equity on employment in subsequent years. After this first wave 
of publications, there was less interest in this topic with only very few published studies up 
until 2001. However, a new discussion was started in recent years as the economic importance 
of private equity around the globe grew and the impact of private equity firms became more 
important for practitioners and policy makers alike. In 2005, a harsh public debate on private 
equity – the so-called locust debate – had its roots in Germany with the legendary quote from 
Franz Müntefering, a leading Social Democrat who later held the position of Germany’s vice 
chancellor: “Some of these investors do not waste a thought on people whose jobs they de-
stroy. They remain anonymous, faceless, descend like swarms of locusts on companies, de-
vour them and move on. It is this kind of capitalism we are fighting“. This prompted a broad 
discussion between academia, the industry, media and unions in Germany. The so-called lo-
cust debate quickly spread to the U.K. and other European countries and evolved around the 
accusation that private equity firms achieve exceptional rates of returns through brutal cost 
reductions and at the expense of employees (Davis et al. 2008). A large body of literature on 
the topic emerged in recent years in order to shed light on these accusations.  
Theoretical explanations of the impact of private equity fall into two main categories: value 
transfer and value creation. The value transfer perspective explains changes post-buyout pri-
marily based on a value shift from stakeholders of the company to new shareholders. Employ-
ees are one group of stakeholders from which a value transfer can take place (Fox/Marcus 
1992; Thompson/Wright 1995). The theory is based on Shleifer/Summers 1988 who argue 
that value is redistributed in takeovers from employees to new equity holders as they allow to 
renege ex-post on implicit contracts. Their theory can be applied to buyouts as they also pro-
vide for the opportunity to renegotiate implicit contracts with employees and, thereby, to re-
duce high levels of employment and wages (Ippolito/James 1992). Following value transfer 
theory, private equity firms are expected to have a negative impact on employment as layoffs 
and renegotiations of wages are expected, and, in the long run, this could lead to a deteriora-
tion of trust between employees and shareholders. 
Under the value creation perspective, financial, governance or operational engineering are 
given in the literature as main explanation for increasing company value post-buyout. In re-
gard to financial engineering, equity is usually substituted by debt in a buyout which reduces 
the agency cost of free cash flow by decreasing the cash flow available for management to 
spend on corporate assets with zero or negative net present values or to waste it through or-
ganizational inefficiencies. The high leverage forces managers to pursue focused strategies, 
increase efficiencies and divest unprofitable units to generate funds to retire debt (Jensen 
1986; Heinkel/Zechner 1990) which leads to an expected negative employment growth post-
buyout. Governance engineering relates to activities with which private equity firms control 
their portfolio companies. Due to less dispersed ownership in LBOs compared to public cor-
porations, management is monitored more closely and encouraged to maximise firm value 
(Jensen 1989). Operational engineering refers to initiatives to operating improvements, e.g. to 
improve productivity, to increase organic growth or to pursue acquisition opportunities. The 
external equity provided by private equity firms can be the prerequisite to pursue growth op-
tions in the portfolio company. In addition, non-financial support from private equity firms, 
e.g. through their industry and/or operating expertise, can help to identify growth potential or 
operational improvements (Kaplan/Strömberg 2008). Furthermore, operational progress can 
take place in a buyout through a cognitive shift to an entrepreneurial mindset and to pursue 
company renewal leading to revitalization and strategic innovation (Wright et al. 2001; Wright et al. 2000; Zahra 1995; Bull 1989). From a theoretical perspective, it remains unclear 
whether governance and operational engineering have a positive or negative impact on em-
ployment post-buyout. In the case private equity mainly enhances the opportunity to realize 
operational growth an increase in employment can be expected. However, in case the govern-
ance and operational engineering is targeted more towards restructuring, a negative impact on 
employment is likely. It is therefore not possible to draw a consistent conclusion on the im-
pact of private equity on employment from value creation theory. 
In addition to the attempts to explain the impact of private equity from a theoretical point of 
view, many empirical studies were undertaken on this subject. The resulting body of literature 
is highly fragmented as it is based on different methodologies, samples, geographies and time 
frames. This makes it difficult to draw common conclusions on the question of whether or not 
private equity firms can be labelled either positively or negatively – as “angels or demons” – 
when it comes down to their impact on employment-related aspects such as employment 
growth and other financial and non-financial indicators of employment. We want to fill this 
research gap by systematically reviewing evidence and, thereby, we attain a level of under-
standing which goes beyond that achieved in any individual study. 
To our knowledge, our study is the first comprehensive review of empirical studies on the 
employment impact of private equity firms. There exists one systematic review by Wright et 
al. 2009 but it has a broader focus on the overall economic impact of private equity. In their 
analysis, the impact on productivity and the impact on employment and wages are two of a 
total of nine headings. In these two employment related sections, they outline only briefly key 
evidence and only take into consideration a total of 18 studies mainly from the U.S. and U.K. 
buyout market. Their aim is to give insights on important results without further analysing the 
underlying methodologies. Therefore, they do not attain our level of detail required to judge 
the methodologies and to understand the underlying context of different results on a variety of 
employment-related aspects.  
Our literature review is focused on private equity investments in later stage companies, so-
called buyouts. We include both private-to-private and public-to-private transactions in our 
analysis. To provide for a homogenous subject matter, we disregard venture capital as early 
stage investments in high-growth start-ups. The business model of later stage buyout funds 
differs fundamentally from venture capital funds, as portfolio companies of the latter are still 
in an early stage of their company lifecycle and, in case of survivorship, are expected to ex-
perience fast company growth leading also to high employment growth. 
 
 
2  Review Framework 
 
As described below, our systematic review of existing research follows a clear three step ap-
proach in order to allow for completeness and rigour (Tranfield et al. 2003).  
Step 1: Definition of review framework 
In our review framework, we cover a broad range of aspects related to the impact of private 
equity on employment. The impact of private equity on (I.) employment growth is investi-
gated and includes overall growth, growth by region, net vs. gross growth and organic vs. 
non-organic growth. Other aspects of employment which we analyse include (II.) financial 
indicators and (III.) non-financial indicators. Financial indicators are wages, other forms of 
employee compensation and labour productivity. Non-financial indicators of employment 
include changes in employment structure (e.g. change from full time to part time employ-
ment), employee development and other qualitative factors influencing the work environment.  
Step 2: Collection of publications Our aim was to ensure a comprehensive, unbiased search for evidence based studies. In a first 
step, we used a number of keywords for an internet based search for publications. We used  
EBSCO Host via the Business Source Premier database, Science Direct, SSRN and Google 
Scholar as internet based databases for scholarly publications. We also made sure to identify 
publications by non-academic institutions such as national and international industry associa-
tions, auditing/consulting firms or national and international trade union organisations by 
screening their websites and through general web searches using Google. In addition, we 
found references iteratively using references cited in the already identified publications. A 
total number of 120 publications were identified in this step.  
Our references are likely to be biased towards literature published in English, German and 
French due to the language skills of the authors. We cannot rule out the risk of not including 
publications from emerging markets, e.g. in Asia, written in native languages. However, we 
assume that important studies from emerging markets would have been published in English. 
Step 3: Evaluation of material 
The following exclusion criteria were defined in order to decide on the inclusion of the refer-
ences in our review: First, publications with a focus on early stage venture capital deals (19 
publications), on mergers & acquisitions in general (3 publications) and publications that did 
not differentiate between early and later stage investments (15 publications) were not in-
cluded. Second, publications which were not based on original empirical studies such as theo-
retical papers (6 publications), position papers by unions (4 publications) or other descriptive 
publications (12 publications) were excluded. Finally, publications were excluded which do 
not entail detailed evidence (8 publications) or which do not offer sufficient clarity to judge 
the applied methodology (4 publications). This selection process led to a total of 49 publica-
tions being included in our analysis.  
 
 
3  Descriptive Analysis of the Body of Literature 
 
The 49 evidence based studies analyzed in our systematic review were published between 
1983 and 2009. As shown in Fig. 1, the number of studies published over time mirrors the 
growth in the global buyout market. The first academic studies were undertaken in the mid-
1980s when the industry was still in its infancy. The first buyout boom in the late 1980s, with 
the USD 25 billion leveraged buyout of RJR Nabisco (Burrough/Helyar 2004) marking its 
peak in 1988, led to growing interest from academia in subsequent years with seminal papers 
such as Jensen 1989, Rappaport 1990 and Kaplan 1991 shaping the debate on buyouts as new 
corporate organizational form. This period of increasing academic debate manifested itself in 
a first wave of academic studies on the employment impact of private equity between 1989 
and 1992 (Fig. 1).  
However, the bulk of studies were undertaken in a second wave, with over 70% being pub-
lished post 2000. At that time, the market for buyouts experienced rapid growth both in the 
number and value of deals (Stromberg 2008). As Fig. 1 shows, the growth of leveraged buy-
outs paralleled with the second wave of publications on the employment impact of private 
equity. In the period 2000 to 2004, a total of six studies were undertaken with the primary 
focus on employment and wage growth effects. All studies published in this period were fo-
cused on European countries mirroring an upswing of buyout activity in Europe and the start 
of a political debate on private equity in continental Europe. The upcoming interest in the 
subject in continental Europe is not surprising as these countries are generally characterised 
by a more stakeholder oriented culture as opposed to the shareholder value approach mainly 
followed in the U.S. or the U.K.. The main initiators of the first studies in this second wave 
were European private equity associations as well as auditing and consulting firms active in the private equity market. Unions also began to compile their own fact based evidence on 
private equity and published studies in 2006 and 2007. In recent years, academia has shown 
growing interest in the employment topic. While academic studies only accounted for 25% of 
publications in 2003 to 2004, this figure rose to over 85% in 2008.  
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LBOs with private equity involvement**
Notes: n = 49. Year slot 07-08 includes two studies from 2009.
* Association/Auditing/Consulting includes studies with involvement from academic institutions (6 studies)












Fig. 2 shows how the content and methodology of publications evolved over time. After ini-
tial survey based studies in the mid 1980s, the first wave of empirical studies between 1989 
and 1992 used a wide range of methodologies and covered issues in all three categories of 
employment aspects. The second wave of publications post 2001 again started off with studies 
based on surveys which were often criticized by unions and the media for small sample sizes 
and biases (see e.g. Hall 2007). First, questionnaire based studies suffer from a bias as only 
existing companies can take part in the survey leaving out unsuccessful cases of liquidated 
companies (survivorship bias). In addition, primarily companies with positive employment 
growth may participate in surveys (self-selection bias) or the numbers may be projected as 
more positive than they actually are (response bias). However, as we will show in the the-
matic analysis of the evidence in section 4, they still offer interesting insights on comparisons 
across different types of buyouts and on specific aspects for which no other evidence exists.  
 







































































Archival data analysis Survey* Case studies
Notes: n=88 (most studies included evidence on more than one category). Year slot 07-08 includes two studies from 2009.
* May also include analysis of data from public databases in addition to survey  
 
 
By the time period 2007 to 2008, the type of methodologies applied as well as the units of 
analysis became more diverse. Whereas in 2004 none of the publications were based on ar-
chival data analysis, this methodology has grown in importance and was used in 50% of stud-
ies in 2007 and over 65% in 2008. In the past two years, studies based on archival data analy-
sis were undertaken with large samples of buyouts from the U.S. and U.K. going down to 
plant-level analysis of changes in employment. The increasing number of studies based on 
archival data analysis in recent years is linked to the increasing interest of academia in this 
subject. Post 2006, ten empirical studies based on archival data were undertaken with the in-
volvement of academia, three by associations, auditing and/or consulting firms and one by the 
business press.  
The distribution of empirical studies across different geographies is shown in Fig. 3. The bulk 
of studies analyze the U.S. and U.K. private equity market with studies of the U.S. and U.K. 
market combined amounting to 59%. For studies based on archival data analysis, the com-
bined dominance of the two countries is even more pronounced, at 75%. This can in part be 
explained by data availability problems. In major continental European countries, it is not 
possible to obtain reliable employment data for a large sample of privately held companies 
from public databases. The studies on most continental European markets therefore had to be 
based on questionnaires.  
 










Archival data analysis Survey* Case studies
Notes: n = 51 (two studies included evidence on more than one country)




4  Thematic Analysis of Empirical Evidence 
 
4.1  Evidence on Employment Growth 
 
We identified 22 archival data based studies which show evidence on employment growth. In 
addition, a total of 16 survey based studies entail results on employment growth and related 
aspects. Furthermore, a number of case studies also offer in-depth analysis of different aspects 
of employment growth. 
Private equity firms go through an intensive selection process in order to identify investment 
targets which are likely to surpass their hurdle rate of return. Portfolio companies are not cho-
sen at random but according to their potential sources for operational or financial efficiency 
gains and/or growth. Therefore, the endogeneity of the investment decision has to be taken 
into consideration when analyzing the effect of private equity on employment (Amess et al. 
2008). Evidence on changes in employment after a buyout is more meaningful if it is com-
pared to an appropriate counterfactual.  
Evidence in archival data based studies. There are different approaches in trying to take 
account of this endogeneity and to mirror the counterfactual in archival data based studies. 
First, the investment decision can be treated as endogenous dummy variable in modelling the 
demand for labour equation. Second, different matching algorithms, e.g. based on industry, 
size, productivity or company age, can be applied to construct a matched control sample. 
Third, an industry adjustment approach can be followed e.g. through benchmarking against 
industry averages or adjusting for industry effects. In reviewing our archival data based stud-
ies, we found that differing results between studies can be explained by the applied methodol-
ogy to mirror the counterfactual and the underlying sample. Therefore, we grouped the archi-
val data based studies according to their underlying methodology and we then further analyse 
reasons for differing results (see Tab. 1). 
In the first group, we identified two studies which account for endogeneity by treating the 
decision to undertake a buyout as endogenous variable when estimating the demand for labour 
equation (Amess/Wright 2007a; Amess/Wright 2007b). Both of these studies find no signifi-
cant effect of buyouts on employment from the transaction year to up to five years post trans-
action. In Amess/Wright 2007a, similar levels of employment growth are found in private 
equity-backed LBOs and in controls from the deal date to up to five years thereafter. 
Amess/Wright 2007b also find an insignificant impact on employment growth when control-
ling for endogeneity in their group of 1,350 U.K. LBOs which includes private equity-backed 
and other buyouts. They show significant differences for management buyouts (MBOs) and 
management buyins (MBIs) with MBOs having a higher average employment growth and 
MBIs having a lower employment growth compared to controls. The study does not yield 
specific findings for private equity-backed buyouts but it underlines the importance of differ-
entiating between buyout types such as MBIs and MBOs when analyzing the impact on em-
ployment. Overall, both studies show the necessity to account for endogeneity of the buyout 
decision.  
The second group of archival data based studies entails six studies which apply a matching 
strategy to construct a control sample (Amess et al. 2008; Davis et al. 2008; Cressy et al. 
2008; Liebeskind et al. 1992; Marti Pellon et al. 2007; Toubeau 2006). Amess et al. 2008 use 
propensity matching methodology and control for pre-buyout employment growth, wages, 
productivity and age to construct a counterfactual control sample for 232 U.K. buyouts. They 
find no evidence for a significant impact of private equity-backed buyouts on organic growth 
of employment but show a significant negative impact on organic employment growth for buyouts without private equity sponsorship and for mergers & acquisitions compared to con-
trols. A key difference between this study and the other studies within this group is the inclu-
sion of pre-buyout employment growth in the matching algorithm. In other words, compared 
to companies with a similar employment growth prior to the transaction date, no significant 
impact of private equity on employment is found in portfolio companies. In case the matching 
algorithm does not include pre-employment growth, a significant impact of private equity can 
be shown. It has to be noted that the similar results of Amess/Wright 2007b, Amess/Wright 
2007a and Amess et al. 2008 can potentially be an indicator of an overlap of the samples as 
they are all based on U.K. buyouts listed in similar databases. However, the underlying time-
frame differs in these studies and, therefore, the overlap is likely to not be substantial.    
Four papers find a negative impact of private equity on employment in the wake of a buyout 
compared to controls matched by industry, size and other factors. First, Cressy et al. 2008 
analyze 57 U.K. buyouts which are matched by controls based on industry and size. Relative 
to controls, buyouts show 7% lower employment in the year after the transaction and higher 
decreases in employment up to the fourth year post-transaction. In the fifth year post-buyout, 
they find that relative to controls buyouts show 2% higher employment growth. 
Second, Davis et al. 2008 base their matching strategy on industry, age, size and an indicator 
for single vs. multi-plant firms and analyze 11,000 buyouts and 300,000 plants of U.S. buy-
outs. Relative to controls, plants of buyouts show on average 7% higher cumulative decreases 
in employment two years post-buyout. Two years pre-buyout, buyout plants also have higher 
cumulative decreases in employment of 4% which is an indication of the endogeneity of the 
buyout decision. Private equity firms seem to invest in companies which have already experi-
enced declining employment numbers in the wake of the buyout and which offer potential for 
further increases of operational efficiencies post-buyout. They also reveal differences depend-
ing on the industry of the investment target. Portfolio companies in retail, service, finance, 
insurance and real estate show a significant decline in employment whereas no significant 
difference was found for companies in the manufacturing sector. 
As gross job creation on firm-level is equal in buyouts and controls in Davis et al. 2008, more 
layoffs take place in buyout firms in the wake of the transaction. The firm-level analysis also 
reveals that greenfield job creation is higher in buyouts, with greenfield jobs accounting for 
15% of total employment, than in controls with 9% two years post-transaction. In addition, 
buyouts are found to be more involved in acquisitions and divestitures. Therefore, Davis et al. 
2008 conclude that private equity firms are catalysts for creative destruction and accelerate 
contraction of less efficient activities as well as growth in new, higher value business lines.  
Third, Liebeskind et al. 1992 apply matching based on industry, size and level of diversifica-
tion and show that employment declined in LBOs and grew in control firms. In addition, they 
find LBOs to divest more business lines compared to controls and, thereby, give further evi-
dence of private equity firms promoting creative destruction. Fourth,  Acharya/Kehoe 2008 
show for a sample of 66 U.K. buyouts a lower annual growth rate in number of employees 
compared to quoted peers in the same industry. However, the difference in employment 
growth is statistically insignificant. 
In contrast to these four studies, we identified three additional papers based on similar meth-
odologies but which show a positive impact of private equity on employment. These three 
papers use samples of buyouts in France (Boucly et al. 2009), Spain (Marti Pellon et al. 2007) 
and in Belgium (Toubeau 2006). Boucly et al. 2009 analyse 830 French buyouts which were 
closed between 1994 and 2004 and apply a matching strategy based on industry and size to 
construct a control sample. They show a strong increase in employment from the transaction 
date to four years thereafter. The employment growth in buyouts is 13% higher than in their 
control group. Marti Pellon et al. 2007 find average annual growth in employees in the three 
years post buyouts of 6.2% and an annual growth of matched controls based on location, in-dustry and size of 2.2%. Toubeau 2006 finds significant higher increases in number of em-
ployees in buyouts compared to controls in similar industries and sizes. 
The differing results of these three studies compared to the U.S. and U.K. based studies de-
scribed above may be an indication that the employment impact differs depending on the in-
stitutional context, e.g. the development stage of the credit and stock markets and/or the ma-
turity of the buyout market. Both U.S.A. and U.K. have a long history of buyout activities and 
can be considered to have well developed public capital market. In contrast, France, Spain and 
Belgium have less mature capital markets and less history in buyout activities. In these coun-
tries, private equity firms may have the role of complementing the public capital market by 
giving companies access to external growth finance which would otherwise be capital con-
strained. In more mature capital markets, companies may have better opportunities to receive 
growth finance from other external financing sources and, therefore, private equity firms may 
invest proportionally more often in companies which offer the potential of operational effi-
ciencies rather than growth opportunities (Boucly et al. 2009). In addition, private equity 
firms may have more flexibility to cut employment in more shareholder value oriented cul-
tures like the U.S. or the U.K. than in countries with a traditionally higher commitment to 
employees due to a more stakeholder oriented approach. This could then explain why private 
equity firms were found to alleviate employment growth compared to controls in countries 
like France, Spain or Belgium and to have a negative impact on employment in the U.S. and 
U.K. market.   
Paper in the third group follow an industry adjustment approach in their methodology and are 
all based on the U.S. or U.K. market (Chaplinsky et al. 1998; Weir et al. 2008; Kaplan 1989). 
All of them show decreases in number of employees in buyouts relative to the industry. 
Chaplinsky et al. 1998 show in a study of 180 U.S. buyouts industry-adjusted mean decreases 
of employment of 1.8% three years and 1.7% five years post-buyout for MBOs. In analyzing 
122 public-to-private transactions in the U.K., Weir et al. 2008 also find significant employ-
ment decreases in relation to industry averages in the first year post-buyout in private equity-
backed companies. Kaplan 1989 separates buyouts involved in acquisitions and divestitures in 
his analysis of a total of 76 U.S. public-to-private transactions. In his subsample excluding 
companies with acquisitions and divestitures, he finds that private equity-backed buyouts re-
duce employment relative to the industry by 6.2% between one year prior to the transaction 
and one year thereafter, but his results are not significant. For the whole sample, including 
companies with non-organic growth, he shows significant employment decreases of 12% over 
the same time period relative to the industry. Smith 1990 finds significant industry adjusted 
reductions in employment from one year prior to the buyout to one year thereafter only for 
companies which have sold major parts of their assets after the transaction. The results of 
Kaplan 1989 and Smith 1990 stress the relevance of divestitures for changes in number of 
employees post buyout.  
As fourth group, we found two U.S. based empirical studies which compare buyouts to ran-
domly selected samples and, consistent with other U.S. based studies described above, both of 
them found higher decreases in employment in buyouts than in controls. First, 
Lichtenberg/Siegel 1990 analyze the employment impact on plant-level and thus measure 
organic employment growth only. Between one year prior to the transaction and two years 
thereafter, they show a cumulative decline in non-production worker employment of 8.5% in 
buyout plants compared to non-buyout plants. Production worker employment also declines, 
but less than white collar employment and not significantly so (see section 4.3). Second, 
Muscarella/Vetsuypens 1990 find that 92% of the random sample showed higher employment 
growth compared to buyouts. However, in comparison with buyouts with no acquisition and 
divestiture activities only 15% of the random sample showed higher employment growth. Evidence from survey based studies. A number of survey based studies offer additional evi-
dence on employment growth (see Tab. 2). They yield interesting insights, particularly for 
European countries for which archival data analysis cannot be undertaken due to the lack of 
data. The different studies share some common results. Many of them reveal that of the sam-
ple analyzed, between 20 and 25% of companies show a decrease in employment post-buyout 
(AFIC/Constantin/L.E.K. 2003; Bacon et al. 2004; CMBOR 2008; CMBOR 2004; Hanney 
1986; Malone 1989; Wright et al. 1992). As mentioned above, survey based studies are likely 
to suffer from survivorship, self-selection and/or response bias, potentially leading to overly 
optimistic results in terms of employment changes. However, the results in archival data 
analysis based studies do not consistently show higher percentages of companies in their sam-
ple with decreases in employment compared to surveys. In terms of the average employment 
growth per year, the results are less consistent across different studies with a range of +2% to 
+13% and are likely to reveal different context factors such as geography, industry mix or 
time period and different backgrounds of buyouts in the sample. For instance, in the study by 
PWC/BVK 2005, turnarounds are excluded in the calculation of average annual employment 
growth of buyouts, whereas in most other studies turnarounds are included in the main sam-
ple. All of them show positive average growth rates per year across the sample that are higher 
than broad benchmark growth rates such as national averages or averages from comparable 
public companies (see Tab. 2). The results of these studies should be seen with caution not 
only because of the limitations due to potential biases but also because most of them originate 
from non peer reviewed publications.  
However, insights on employment growth in different types of buyouts are revealed. 
Achleitner/Klöckner 2005 find the highest average annual employment growth in family firm 
buyouts (7.1%) compared to secondary buyouts (3.4%), going private buyouts (2.8%) as well 
as spin-off buyouts (1.6%) and negative average annual employment growth only in turn-
around buyouts, at -3.8%. Their findings highlight the importance of the buyout background 
for the employment impact of private equity which could help explain the differences in re-
sults between mature and less mature capital markets as described above. It could be that in 
less mature capital markets private equity firms more often fulfil the role of providing exter-
nal growth finance and, hence, invest more often in companies with higher employment 
growth than in more mature markets as these companies may be more restricted to other 
sources of external growth financing. 
In regard to employment growth by region, a common accusation against private equity firms 
is that they close local entities and move them to countries with lower employment costs. 
Only few studies analyse the employment growth post-buyout in different regions. 
AFIC/Constantin 2007 reveal that 78% of all new jobs created in French buyout companies 
are located in France, their home country. CMBOR 2008 show that local employment in-
creased in 26%, decreased in 7% and stayed the same in 67% of buyout companies. 
Case study evidence. Case study evidence also reveals interesting findings on employment 
growth-related aspects. In terms of total employment growth, results are mixed and highlight 
the importance of the individual context of a buyout, e.g. the industry or the buyout back-
ground, for employment policies. It seems that the different case studies can broadly be di-
vided into two groups with fundamentally different investment rationales. In one group of 
buyouts, the private equity firms follow a restructuring plan aiming at efficiency gains which 
leads to reductions in employment at least in the initial years post-buyout (examples include 
Messer Griesheim (Achleitner et al. 2008a), AA, Gate Gourmet, Märklin (PSE 2007), Hertz, 
KB Toys, Warner Music, Zeus (SEIU 2007) and Premiere (Faber 2006)). In the second group 
of buyouts, the investment story is based on company growth potential which is discharged 
post-transaction and which manifests itself in employment growth (examples are Picard, 
Frans Bonhomme (PSE 2007), New Look (Achleitner et al. 2008b), Onex (SEIU 2007)).  
4.2  Evidence on Financial Indicators of Employment 
 
We searched for evidence on changes in financial indicators of employment after a buyout 
and focused our search on changes in (1) wages and other forms of compensation, (2) em-
ployee share ownership and employee share option schemes, and (3) employee productivity. 
Compared to employment growth, financial indicators of employment are less frequently ana-
lyzed in the literature. We identified a total of 21 large sample studies (see Tab. 3 and Tab. 4) 
and a number of case studies revealing evidence on financial indicators of employment.  
In terms of changes in wages and other forms of compensation, the value transfer hypothesis 
suggests that renegotiation of employment contracts is likely to take place post-buyout result-
ing in a decrease of compensation for employees. In this context, it is again important to com-
pare wage changes in private equity backed buyouts with an appropriate counterfactual. There 
are only three archival data based studies which take this into account (Amess/Wright 2007b; 
Amess et al. 2008; Lichtenberg/Siegel 1990). Overall, they give a neutral picture in terms of 
the impact of private equity on wages. First, Amess/Wright 2007b control for endogeneity of 
the investment decision and find that buyouts lead to an increase in wages but that the in-
crease was slightly lower compared to wage increases in their matched control sample. How-
ever, they do not differentiate between private equity backed and other buyouts. Amess et al. 
2008 find that private equity-backed LBOs have no significant impact on wages, whereas 
buyouts without private equity sponsorship show an increase in wages in comparison with a 
matched control sample based on pre-buyout employment growth, pre-buyout wage growth, 
productivity and age. As noted above, it is likely that these two studies are partly based on the 
same sample but as they cover different timeframes, the overlap is expected to not be substan-
tial. Lichtenberg/Siegel 1990 reveal a decrease in compensation for non-production workers 
and an increase for production workers compared to a random sample of non buyout plants. 
Between one year prior to the buyout and two years thereafter, annual and hourly compensa-
tion for blue-collar employees increase by 3.6% and 2.3% respectively.  
In contrast to these archival data based studies, we identified a number of survey based stud-
ies which reveal a more positive view on the impact of buyouts on wages and find for the 
companies in their sample only a small share in which wages were reduced. As explained 
before, this evidence has to be viewed with caution due to potential biases in surveys. 
Bruining et al. 2005 analyze 145 buyouts in the U.K. and 45 buyouts in the Netherlands and 
find a positive impact on pay levels in both countries post-buyout. Interestingly, they do not 
find different impacts for the U.K. and the Netherlands. Bacon et al. 2004 find that compensa-
tion for non-managerial employees increased in 55% of buyouts in their sample of 148 U.K. 
buyouts, decreased in 2% and stayed the same in 43%. The studies by Bruining et al. 2005 
and Bacon et al. 2004 do not distinguish between private equity-backed and other buyouts in 
their analysis. However, Bacon et al. 2004 acknowledge that in their survey the involvement 
of private equity investors lead to downward pressure on wages. It is important to notice that 
the U.K. survey used in Bruining et al. 2005 seems to be the same survey used in Bacon et al. 
2004.  
In other survey based studies, only a small percentage of private equity-backed buyouts of 
around 5% show a decrease in wages and about 70% have not changed compensation post-
buyout (CMBOR 2008; CMBOR 2004). In an earlier study of 56 smaller company buyouts in 
the U.S., Malone 1989 reveals that employment contracts were renegotiated in 12% of his 
sample, and no change took place in 88% of his sample.  
Agency theory predicts an increase in the importance of performance related pay after a buy-
out because the private equity firm aims to align the interests of employees with their own, i.e. 
with company value increases. Such a shift in types of compensation was found consistently in a number of studies. Bruining et al. 2005 show an increase in the number of staff receiving 
merit pay and in the number of staff whose performance is evaluated on an annual or bi-
annual basis, and similar results can be found in Malone 1989, CMBOR 2001 and 
CMBOR/EVCA 2008. The shift to performance based forms of compensation indicates a pol-
icy change in buyouts towards increasing responsibilities of employees for their jobs and in-
creasing pressures on employees to enhance productivity. In addition, a number of studies 
show an increase in other commitment-orientated employment policies such as employee 
share ownership or employee share option schemes. Bruining et al. 2005 and Bacon et al. 
2004 find an increase in non-managerial employees owning shares in the company post-
buyout. Wright et al. 1992 reveal an increase in the use of employee share option schemes 
with 10% of the sample introducing a scheme post-buyout and another 27% of the sample 
planning to introduce one. The increase in commitment-orientated employment policies could 
be interpreted as a shift towards a corporate culture based on an entrepreneurial mindset as it 
puts more emphasis on self-responsibility rather than supervision.  
As described above, agency theory predicts that post-buyout efficiency gains take place in a 
buyout which should lead to increasing productivity. We found evidence on changes in labour 
productivity post-buyout in eight large sample studies and four case studies which yield con-
sistent results and all support the hypothesis of a productivity increase (see Tab. 4). Large 
sample studies show increasing sales per employee (Liebeskind et al. 1992; 
Muscarella/Vetsuypens 1990), sales growth per employee (Deutsche Beteiligungs 
AG/FINANCE 2004), profits per employee (Acharya/Kehoe 2008; Weir et al. 2008; Opler 
1992; Smith 1990) and an increase in total factor productivity (Harris et al. 2005; 
Lichtenberg/Siegel 1990) post-buyout. Consistent results on the increase in productivity were 
found in a number of case studies (Faber 2006; PSE 2007; Achleitner et al. 2008a; Achleitner 
et al. 2008b). Weir et al. 2008 also show that private equity-backed LBOs have significantly 
higher profits per employee post-buyout than buyouts without private equity sponsorship.  
However, two studies found productivity increases in line with benchmark groups (Deutsche 
Beteiligungs AG/FINANCE 2004; Liebeskind et al. 1992). The different results in these stud-
ies are likely to be due to differences in the sample mix. Deutsche Beteiligungs 
AG/FINANCE 2004 show that for sub samples of manufacturing companies private equity 
backed companies show higher increases in productivity compared to the control group. Pri-
vate equity funded automobile supplier companies show sales growth per employee between 
1998 and 2003 of 6.7% which is higher than the increase in the control sample of 2.5%. It 
seems that the equivalent productivity increases in private equity backed companies and con-
trols are due to a large proportion of service based companies in their sample. Liebeskind et 
al. 1992 use a sample of 33 large U.S. buyouts which were closed between 1980 and 1984. 
This relatively small sample of large buyouts is compared to a closely matched sample of 
companies with similar size, industry focus and level of diversification. Overall, productivity 
increases are shown in both the buyout and the control sample.  
 
4.3   Evidence On Non-Financial Indicators of Employment 
 
Our review also investigates evidence on non-financial indicators of employment such as 
changes in employee development, employment structure and other factors influencing the 
work environment to take account of the complexity of impacts private equity firms might 
have on employees. There exists only limited evidence on these indicators and we only found 
a total of 14 large sample studies (see Tab. 5) and a number of case studies which shed some 
light on changes of qualitative aspects of employment post-buyout. 
Following value transfer theories, decreases in resources devoted to employees are expected 
post-buyout. In contrast, evidence in a number of large sample studies reveal a policy shift towards higher investments in long term employee development. Bruining et al. 2005 find an 
increase in investments in high commitment human resources policies and practices, suggest-
ing that buyouts release upside growth potential rather than protecting downside risk. They 
reveal an increase in resources devoted to managing employees and in the amount of em-
ployee training post-buyout, but, as mentioned above, they do not distinguish between private 
equity-backed buyouts and other buyouts (Bruining et al. 2005). Bacon et al. 2004 show simi-
lar findings, with 55% of buyouts increasing the amount of training employees receive and 
only 6% showing a decrease but, as mentioned above, this study is likely to be based on the 
same U.K. sample as Bruining et al. 2005. Other survey based studies also reveal an increase 
in training expenditure post-buyout (AFIC/Constantin 2007; AFIC/Constantin/L.E.K. 2003; 
CMBOR 2008; CMBOR 2004; CMBOR 2001; CMBOR/EVCA 2008). 
We found evidence on different aspects relating to changes in the overall employment struc-
ture in buyout companies such as part-time vs. full-time employees. Based on the value trans-
fer hypotheses, renegotiation of employment contracts to more favourable terms for share-
holders are expected which could imply a shift from full-time to part-time employment. 
Bruining et al. 2005 find an increase in temporary workers for their U.K. sample, whereas a 
decrease was revealed for their Dutch sample. These differences between the U.K. and the 
Netherlands can potentially be explained by the different institutional context. In the U.K., a 
more shareholder oriented approach may lead to lower commitment to employees compared 
to the stakeholder oriented approach traditionally followed in the Netherlands. The institu-
tional context in the Netherlands is characterised by a stakeholder-oriented culture as well as 
strong labour legislation, high degree of trade union influence and involvement of employees 
through a required work council in companies with more than 50 employees. A shift towards 
temporary workers is therefore more difficult to pursue in countries like the Netherlands. In 
an earlier U.K. study, Wright et al. 1990 also find an increasing level of part-time employ-
ment post-buyout.  
Other results on the overall employment structure include findings on the ratio of skilled vs. 
unskilled employees. Amess et al. 2007 reveal a skill-biased organisational change in favour 
of craft and skilled service employees after a buyout. In addition, evidence on an increase in 
R&D intensity post-transaction can be found in Zahra 1995 and Liebeskind et al. 1992 indi-
cating a shift towards R&D intensive labour in buyouts.  
Private equity is likely to have an impact on soft, qualitative factors of employment regarding 
the general work environment such as the amount of employee discretion or changes in the 
general working atmosphere. In a number of studies, higher employee involvement was found 
post-buyout. Amess et al. 2007 found an increase in employee discretion through a reduction 
of hierarchical tiers and supervisory staff. Lichtenberg/Siegel 1990 identify a decline in the 
ratio of non-production to production workers post-buyout and higher compensation of pro-
duction workers which suggest a substitution of direct monitoring by higher responsibility of 
blue-collar employees. Bruining et al. 2005 and Bacon et al. 2004 reveal an increase in em-
ployee involvement, task flexibility and workers’ responsibility after a buyout. In addition, 
they find an increase in the number of employees working in teams.  
As explained above, consistent evidence was found on the increase in labour productivity in 
buyout companies. Furthermore, an increase in performance-related pay and employee share-
ownership was detected in different studies. In addition to the increase in employee involve-
ment and responsibility, these factors may imply a negative impact on the perceived work 
environment, as employees may feel increasing pressures to perform. We did not find a lot of 
evidence on changes in the work environment post-buyout. AFIC/Constantin 2007 identify an 
average decline in absenteeism and turnover rates but this could be interpreted both positively 
as a sign of increasing motivation or, at least for decreasing absenteeism, negatively as a re-
sult of increasing pressures. PSE 2007 identify an increase in working hours per week and a less positive atmosphere between work council and management. Hanney 1986 finds, at 6%, a 
low proportion of buyout companies that withdrew trade union recognition post-buyout and, 
thereby, is consistent with similar findings in other studies (Wright et al. 1990; Wright et al. 
1984; CMBOR/EVCA 2008).  
In addition, there is some evidence indicating changes in terms of communication policies 
with employees after a private equity transaction. CMBOR 2004 and CMBOR/EVCA 2008 
find an increase in communication between management and employees. In the study of 50 
buyouts in France by AFIC/Constantin/L.E.K. 2003, the impact on communication with em-
ployees was perceived to have changed favourably by 31% of managers, unfavourably by 8% 
and to have remained unchanged by 60%. However, it would be important to also investigate 
the opinion of employees on changes in communication as they could perceive it differently, 
possibly in a more negative way, compared to the managers. 
 
 
5  Summary and conclusion 
 
The aim of our paper was to systematically review evidence based research on the employ-
ment impact of private equity firms and, thereby, to increase common knowledge on the sub-
ject. We identified 49 evidence based studies and showed how the research became more so-
phisticated in recent years covering a broad range of methodologies and offering insights on 
diverse aspects of employment. Academia has become more interested in the topic and domi-
nated the outlet of publications in the last two years. Studies are mainly focused on more ma-
ture buyout markets like the U.S. and the U.K., partly due to easier access to employment 
data.  
In regard to employment growth, 22 archival data based studies, 16 survey based studies and 
5 case studies were reviewed. At first sight, results seem to paint an inconsistent picture 
across the different publications. However, when the underlying methodologies and samples 
are analysed, the reasons for discrepancies can be explained. Papers controlling for endogene-
ity of the investment decision do not find a significant impact of private equity on employ-
ment. In comparison to a matched sample but not controlling for pre-buyout employment 
growth, studies based on the U.S.A. and the U.K. consistently find decreasing number of em-
ployees in buyouts compared to controls. Three papers which look at less mature capital mar-
kets – France, Spain and Belgium – find increasing employment post buyout compared to 
matched samples. This gives an indication of the importance of institutional backgrounds for 
the employment impact. It could be that in less mature markets private equity firms give com-
panies access to external growth financing which would otherwise be capital constrained. In 
addition, different labour legislation and a stakeholder vs. shareholder oriented culture is 
likely to lead to different results on the impact of private equity on employment across geog-
raphies. Another important overall result on employment growth is that private equity-backed 
companies are found to create more greenfield jobs and are seen to be more active in acquisi-
tions and divestitures.  
In terms of financial indicators of employment, increasing labour productivity is consistently 
shown in different evidence based studies. The impact of private equity on wages is not ex-
tensively researched yet but the current evidence suggests a neutral role. Additional research 
taking account of the endogeneity of the investment decision and comparing buyouts to an 
appropriate counterfactual is required to better judge the impact of private equity on wages. A 
shift towards higher performance-related compensation and higher employee share ownership 
is shown which goes hand in hand with a shift towards higher employee discretion, higher 
employee involvement and worker responsibility post-buyout. A primarily positive impact on 
other non-financial indicators is shown in a number of studies with increasing funding of em-ployee development and long term investments in the R&D size and capability. However, 
some qualitative indicators of employment such as the work environment have not yet been 
investigated enough to draw common conclusions.  
In sum, our systematic review of the evidence revealed complex consequences of private  
equity on different aspects of employment. It would not only oversimplify the topic but would 
also be incorrect to view private equity firms either negatively or positively – as “angels or 
demons” – in terms of their impact on employment, even though enough individual studies 
exist to support either view for some indicators of employment. This underlines the relevance 
of our paper in comparing and synthesizing findings across the whole body of literature and 
across different indicators of employment.  
Although considerable progress has been made in empirical research on the employment im-
pact of private equity, we still see a number of research gaps. Many large sample studies as 
well as case study research reveal fundamental differences between types of buyouts. Al-
though some seminal papers exist that differentiate between MBOs and MBIs, future empiri-
cal research could go beyond this and also distinguish buyouts with different backgrounds e.g. 
public-to-private transactions vs. private-to-private transactions. It would also be interesting 
to analyze more specific types of private equity investments such as buyouts of family firms 
or divisions of large conglomerates and their impact on employment. In addition, further re-
search on our proposed differentiation based on the investment rationale in restructuring and 
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Category 1: Papers controlling for endogeneity of investment decision 
Amess/Wright 







2  U.K.  1999-
2004 
Matching based on industry 
and size, treating investment 




Controlling for endogeneity, insignificant effect on employment growth of LBOs (MBO & 
MBIs combined) 
Controlling for endogeneity, higher average employment growth for MBOs & lower for 
MBIs compared to controls 
8  8  8
3 
Amess/Wright 
2007a  Not yet  Working 
paper  533 buyouts
2 U.K. 1993-
2004 
Matching based on industry 
and size, treating investment 





Controlling for endogeneity, no significantly different levels of employment in pe & non-pe-
backed LBOs than in controls  8  8  8
3 
Category 2: Papers with matching strategy 
Acharya/Kehoe 
2008  Not yet  Working 
paper  66 buyouts  U.K.  1996-
2004 
Matching with quoted peers 




Buyouts grow employment at 1.6% CAGR compared to 2.7% in quoted peers, difference 
is statistically insignificant  8  8  8 
Amess et al. 2008  Not yet  Working 
paper  232 buyouts
2 U.K. 1996-
2006 
Propensity matching controlling 
for pre-buyout employment, 




No evidence for significant impact of pe-backed LBOs on employment in t+1 or t+2 
Non-pe-backed LBOs: 11% lower employment in t+1 
M&A transactions: 16% lower employment in t+1, 22% lower employment in t+2 
8  8  9 
Boucly et al. 2009  Not yet  Working 
paper  830 buyouts  France  1994-
2004 




Significant increase in number of employees between t and t+3, 13% higher employment 
growth in buyouts compared to controls  8  8  8 
Cressy et al. 
2008  Not yet  Working 
paper  57 buyouts  U.K.  1995-
2002 





Relative to controls, 7% lower employment in buyouts in t+1, cumulating to 23% lower 
employment in t+4; in t+5 increase by 2%   8  8  8 




300,000 plants  
U.S.A.  1980-
2005 
Plant matching based on 
industry, age, size and indica-





7% (4%) average cumulative decrease in targets relative to controls two years post-
buyout (two years pre-buyout) 
No employment differences between targets and controls in manufacturing sector, 
significant decline in targets in retail, services & finance, insurance & real estate 
Gross job creation equal in targets & controls; greater job destruction in targets 
Greenfield job creation: 15% in buyouts, 9% in controls; Acquisition (divestiture)  rate: 
7.3% (5.7%) in buyouts, 4.7% (2.9%) in controls  
(9)  9  9 
Liebeskind et al. 
1992  9 
Financial 
Management 
33 public to 
privates  U.S.A.  1980-
1984 
Matching based on industry, 
size and level of diversification 
Difference in 
means 
Mean number of employees declined in LBOs and grew in control firms, resulting in 
significant differences between  the samples 
Mean number of plants declined in LBOs and grew in control firms, resulting in signifi-
cant differences between the samples  
8  8  8 
Marti Pellon et al. 
2007  8 
ASCI  
Research Paper  100 buyouts  Spain  1993-
2004 
Matching based on location, 
industry and size 
Difference in 
means 
In LBOs, average annual growth in employees from t to t+3 of 6.2%; in controls, average 
annual growth in employees from t to t+3 of 2.2%   8  8  8 
Toubeau 2006   8 
Doctoral  
thesis  53 buyouts  Belgium  1995-
2005 




Significant higher increase in number of employees in buyouts compared to controls 
between t and t+2  8  8  8 
Category 3: Papers with industry adjustment approach 
Chaplinsky et al. 





(EBO, MBO)  U.S.A.  1980-




Relative to their industry, EBOs and MBOs reduce employment after the buyout;  
Industry adjusted mean decrease: In t+3: -9.6% for EBOs, -1.8% for MBOs; In t+5: -10.8% 
for EBOs, -1.7% for MBOs  8  8  8 




76 public to 
privates  U.S.A.  1980-
1986 




Total sample: Relative to their industry, MBOs reduce employment between t-1 and t+1 
at -12.0%; 30.9% of sample reduce employment 
Excluding companies with divestitures & acquisitions: Relative to their industry, MBOs 
reduce employment between t-1 to t+1 at -6.2%, but results are not significant; 38.5% of 
sample reduce employment 
8  8  9 
Smith 1990  9 
Journal of 
Financial 
58 public to 
privates  U.S.A.  1977-
1986 
Adjustments for industry effects  Difference in 
median 
Relative to industry, number of employees decreases from t-1 to t+1 , but insignificant  
Relative to industry, asset-sale sample shows significant median reductions in employ- 8  8  (9)  
Economics  ment from t-1 to t+1 
Weir et al. 2008  Not yet  Working 
paper 
122 public to 
privates  U.K.  1998-
2004 




Relative to industry average, significant decrease in employment in pe-backed LBOs in 
t+1; further decreases in t+2 to t+5 but no significant differences to industry average 
Significant decrease in employment in non-pe-backed LBOs in t+1, increase in employ-
ment in subsequent years relative to industry average 
8  8  8 
Category 4: Other papers with control samples  
Lichten-





plants  U.S.A.  1983-
1986 




Between t-1 & t+2, significant reductions in non-production worker employment, cumula-
tive decline of 8.5% 
Production worker employment declines, but less and not significant 
(9)  8  9 
Mus-
carella/Vetsuypen
s 1990  9 
Journal of 
Finance 
72 public to 
privates  U.S.A.  1976-
1987 




For all LBOs: Median reduction in employment between LBO and IPO -0.6%; 92% of 
random sample showed higher employment growth 
For LBOs with no acquisition/divestiture: Median increase in employment between LBO 
and IPO 17%; 15% of random sample showed higher employment growth 
8  8  9 
 
Note:  
1The table does not include archival data based studies which do not follow a matching strategy, an industry adjustment approach or other forms of control samples (e.g. in 
Shapiro/Pham 2008, Taylor/Bryant 2007, Ernst & Young 2007, PWC/AIFI 2006, Marti Pellon et al. 2005).  
2 Likely to be based in part on the same sample. 
3In control sample, no 
companies included with increases in total assets >100%. 9 = included in analysis, (9) = partly included in analysis, 8 = not included in analysis. LBO = leveraged buyout, EBO = 




Tab. 2: Survey based studies on employment growth 
 
Employment Growth 
Authors, Year  Peer  
reviewed?  Sample Geogr.  Time  Decrease in % of 
Sample 
Average Growth in 
sample  Benchmark Growth 
Other Major Findings on Employment Growth 
Achleitner/Klöckner 2005  8  99 buyouts  Europe  1997-
2004  33% 2.4%  p.a.  0.7% (EU25);  
0.1% (DJ 600) p.a. 
Buyouts outgrew listed comp. in 6 of 10 industries; Growth p.a.: 7.1% in family firms, 
3.4% in secondaries, 2.8% in going privates, 1.6% in spin-offs, -3.8% in turnarounds   
AFIC/Constantin 2007  8  94 buyouts  France  2003-
2005    4.1% p.a.  0.6% p.a.    78% of all new jobs created in French buyouts are located in France 
AFIC/Constantin/L.E.K. 2003  8  50 buyouts  France  1999-
2003  20% 8.7%  p.a.  2.7% p.a. 
(corporate labour force)   
AIFI 2001  8  101 buyouts  Italy  1988-
2000   1.6%  p.a. -1.5% p.a.  
(SME sample) 
Employment increase prior to buyout: 1.0% p.a.; on average, 1% of employees were 
laid off leading to a gross growth of 2.6% 
Bacon et al. 2004  9  148 buyouts  U.K.  1998-
1999  21%      
Chapman/Klein 2009  Not yet  288 buyouts  U.S.A.  1984-
2006    13.4% p.a.  
(from t to exit)    
CMBOR 2008  8  70 buyouts  Netherlands  1992-
2005  22%     Local employment increased in 26%, decreased in 7% and stayed the same in 67% of 
companies 
CMBOR 2005  8 
117 family 
buyouts  Europe  1994-
2003    7.0% p.a.  
(from t-2 to t+2)    
CMBOR 2004  8  46 buyouts  Netherlands  1992-
2002  23%      
CMBOR 2001  8  300 buyouts  Europe  2000  26%  Average: 47.5%  
(from to to exit)    
Deutsche Beteiligungs 
AG/FINANCE 2004  8  70 buyouts  Germany  1999-
2003   4.5%  p.a. 
2.2% p.a. 
(control sample) 
Job cuts in market downturns less severe than in control sample 
Hanney 1986  9  57 buyouts  U.K.  1980-
1983  24%      
Malone 1989  9  56 buyouts  U.S.A.  1981-
1987  25%     Change in regard to elimination of rank-and-file workers post-buyout: 68% no change, 
7% less, 20% more, 5% far greater emphasis 
PWC/BVK 2005  8  128 buyouts  Germany  2000-
2004  5%  Median: 4.4%  
excl. turnar. (2000-2004)    Median decrease in turnaround buyouts: -28.6% (2000-2004) 
Wright et al. 1992  9  182 buyouts  U.K.  1986  25%  6.3% in t    In t+1, employment increased at 1.9% 
Wright et al. 1984  9  111 buyouts  U.K.  1983  44%  18.1% in t      




reviewed?  Sample Geogr.  Method.  Time  Findings on change in compensation 
Amess/Wright 2007b  9  1,350 LBOs
1 U.K.  ADA  1999-
2004  Wage increase, but lower in all LBOs and in MBIs than in controls 
Amess et al. 2008  Not yet  232 LBOs
1 U.K.  ADA  1996-
2006 
No impact on wages in pe-backed LBOs, wage increase in non-pe-
backed LBOs 
Lichtenberg/Siegel 1990  9  1,132 plants  U.S.A.  ADA  1983-
1986 
Wage increase for production employees between t-1 and t+2 at 3.5% 
(2.3%) annual (hourly) compensation, decrease for non-production 
workers 
AFIC/Constantin 2007  8 94  buyouts  France Survey  2003-
2005  Wage increase of average 3.3% p.a. 
Bacon et al. 2004  9 148  buyouts
2 U.K.  Survey  1994-
1997 
Wage increase (decrease) in 55% (2%) of all buyouts, involvement of 
pe investors resulted in downward pressure on wages 
Increase in commitment-orientated employment policies with perform-
ance-related pay and employee share ownership 
Bruining et al. 2005  9 190  buyouts
2 UK,  Netherlands Survey  1992-
1998 
Increase in compensation of non-managerial employees 
Increase in performance-related compensation 
No change in non-managerial employees owning shares 
CMBOR 2008  8 70  buyouts Netherlands  Survey  1992-
2005  Wage increase (decrease) in 25% (3%) of sample 
CMBOR 2004  8 46  buyouts Netherlands  Survey  1992-
2002  Wage increase (decrease) in 25% (5%) of sample 
CMBOR 2001  8  300 buyouts  Europe  Survey  2000  Increase in performance-related compensation in 28% of sample 
CMBOR/EVCA 2008  8 190  buyouts Europe Survey  2008 
Wage increase (decrease) in 51% (3%) of sample 
Increase in performance-related compensation post buyout 
Malone 1989  9 56  buyouts  U.S.A. Survey  1981-
1987 
Renegotiating employment contracts in 12% of sample, no change in 
88% 
Shift to performance-related pay in 41% of sample 
Wright et al. 1992  9 182  buyouts  U.K.  Survey  1986  Increase in use of share option scheme, 10% of sample introduced one 
post-buyout, 27% planned to introduce one 
 
Note:   ADA = archival data analysis. 
1 Likely to be based in part on the same sample. 
2 U.K. sample likely to be identical in 








reviewed?  Sample Geogr.  Method.  Time  Findings on change in productivity 
Acharya/Kehoe 2008  Not yet  66 buyouts  U.K.  ADA  1996-
2004  11.6% CAGR in EBITDA per employee vs. 5.9% in controls 
Deutsche Beteiligungs 
AG/FINANCE 2004  8 70  buyouts Germany  Survey  1999-
2003 
Average increase in sales growth per employee at 3.0% p.a. vs. 3.4% 
for benchmark group 
Average increase in sales growth per employee p.a. in sub samples of 
manufacturing companies higher than in benchmark group 




U.K. ADA  1994-
1998 
-1.6% (-2.0%) lower total factor productivity of MBOs in the short term 
(long term) prior to buyout 
+70.5% (+90.3%) higher total factor productivity of MBOs in the short 
term (long term) post-buyout 
Lichtenberg/Siegel 1990  9  1,132 plants  U.S.A.  ADA  1983-
1986 
Increase in total factor productivity of plants from 2.0% above industry 
mean three years pre-buyout to 8.3% above industry in three years 
post-buyout 
Liebeskind et al. 1992  9  33 public to 
privates  U.S.A. ADA  1980-
1984 
Significant increase in sales per employees in buyouts and controls 
between t and t+3 
Muscarella/Vetsuypens 1990  9  72 public to 
privates  U.S.A. ADA  1976-
1987  Median increase in sales per employee of 3.1%,  
Opler 1992  9  44 public to 
privates  U.S.A. ADA  1985-
1989 
Average increase in operating profit per employee of 31.8% from t-1 to 
t+2; after industry adjustment: 40.3% 
Smith 1990  9  58 public to 
privates  U.S.A. ADA  1977-
1986 
Median increase in operating profit per employee of 41% from t-1 to t+1; 
after industry adjustment: 71% 
Median increase in operating profit per employee from t-1 to t+2 
insignificant before and after industry adjustment 
Weir et al. 2008  Not yet  122 public to 
privates  U.K. ADA 
1998-
2004 
Relative to t+1, significant increases in profit per employee in years t+2 
and t+5 in pe-backed LBOs; 
Relative to industry average, significant higher profit per employees in 
each post-deal year; 
Pre- and post-buyout, significantly better profit per employee in pe-
backed LBOs than non-pe-backed LBOs 
 
Note:   ADA = archival data analysis.  
 
Tab. 5: Evidence on non-financial indicators of employment 
 
Authors, Year  Peer  
reviewed?  Sample Geogr.  Time  Employment  structure Employee  development  Work  environment 
Studies based on archival data analysis             
Lichtenberg/Siegel 1990  9 1,132  plants  U.S.A.  1983-
1986 
Decline in ratio of nonproduction to produc-
tion workers by 7%    
Liebeskind et al. 1992  9  33 public to 
privates  U.S.A.  1980-
1984  Less increase in R&D intensity in buyouts     
Survey based studies               
AFIC/Constantin 2007  8 94  buyouts  France  2003-
2005    Increase in training expenditure by 10% (as % of total payroll)   Average decline in absenteeism and turnover rates 
AFIC/Constantin/L.E.K. 2003  8 50  buyouts  France  1999-
2003    Impact on training: 26% favourable, 74% neutral  Impact on relations with employees : 31% favourable, 60% 
neutral, 8% unfavourable 
Amess et al. 2007  9  1959 firms, 27263 
employees  U.K. 1998  Skill biased organisational change in favour 
of craft and skilled service employees    Reduction in hierarchical tiers and supervisory staff leading 
to higher employee discretion  
Bacon et al. 2004  9 148  buyouts
1 U.K.  1998-
1999   
Increase (decrease) in amount of employee training in 55% 
(6%) of sample; Low impact of private equity firms on human 
resources policies 
Increase in employee involvement and task flexibility; Low 
impact of private equity firms on human resource policies 
Bruining et al. 2005  9 190  buyouts
1 UK,  Nehterlands 1992-
1998 
Change in the use of temporary workers: 
increase in UK, decrease in Netherlands 
Increase in resources devoted to managing employees and in 
amount of employee training 
Increase in employee involvement and workers responsibil-
ity; increase in total number of employees working in teams 
CMBOR 2008  8 70  buyouts  Netherlands  1992-
2005    Increase in funding for training by 31% (as % of sales)   
CMBOR 2004  8 46  buyouts  Netherlands  1992-
2002    Increase in funding for training by 46% (as % of sales)  Increase in communication between management and 
employees 
CMBOR 2001  8  300 buyouts  Europe  2000    Increase in funding for training by 54% (as % of sales)  High importance of promoting employee involvement post-
buyout 
CMBOR/EVCA 2008  8 190  buyouts  Europe  2008    Impact on amount spend for training : 45% of sample in-
crease, 3% decrease 
Attitude towards union remained unchanged 
Increase in employee commitment through greater em-
ployee engagement, regular team briefings and harmonised 
terms and conditions between management and non-
management 
Hanney 1986  9 57  buyouts  U.K.  1980-
1983      6% of sample withdrew trade union recognition post-buyout 
Wright et al. 1990  9 182  buyouts  U.K.  1983-
1986  Increasing level of part-time employment   
No evidence of explicit attempt by management to remove 
trade unions; no declared incidence  of opposition from 
trade unions against buyout 
Wright et al. 1984  9 111  buyouts  U.K.  1983     
Low level of loss of trade union recognition 
Low opposition from unions towards buyout 
 
Note:  
1 U.K. sample likely to be identical in both studies.  
 